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Ur-Fascism and Neo-Fascism 
Andrew Johnson 
 
 
Abstract: Fascism was once a momentous and imperative subject of study, but as the 
memory of atrocity faded there has been a lessening of stakes and a forgetting of its 
previous import. The election of Donald J. Trump, along with the Brexit referendum, 
growing support for economic nationalism, and a global rise of authoritarian populists, 
has revitalized the “fascism question,” both by scholars and the general public. The 
reemergence (and electoral successes) of far-right ideological partisans threatens the 
neoliberal consensus, challenging received wisdom within political science. The 
dominant approach within international political economy failed to predict escalating 
political opposition to global capitalism. A prescient exception is the heterodox scholar 
William Robinson, who had warned his readers of emergent 21st century fascism. This 
essay is inspired by Robinson’s theories but challenges some of his precepts and 
conclusions. The study of fascism is intertwined with studies of capitalism, financial 
crisis, inter-imperialist rivalry, democracy, and history; however, politics is never 
reducible to the structural settings in which it occurs. There are insoluble contradictions 
between historic fascism and its present-day recurrence. 21st century fascism is haunted 
by an overladen history and overdetermined by the present conjuncture. A renewed 
study of fascism ought to focus criticism upon the hypocrisy of liberal politics. The 
struggle against fascism is also a struggle against liberalism, global capitalism, and 
American empire.  
 
Keywords: American empire, Donald Trump, financial crisis, fascism, global 
capitalism, historicism, international political economy 
 
Brownshirts and Red Caps 
Eight years ago, a fascist murdered seventy-seven people in Norway, the majority of them 
teenagers. Today, that agenda is winning elections around the world. In India and Poland, the 
Philippines and Turkey, Brazil and Hungary, Israel and the United States, far-right, authoritarian, 
ethnonationalist demagogues are in power. In Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Sweden, far-right parties have made stunning electoral gains. In Britain, a center-right government 
struggles to implement a public referendum demanding a withdrawal from the European Union. In Isla 
Vista and El Paso, Charleston and Pittsburgh, Christchurch and Montreal, lone-wolf terrorists, each 
with their own manifesto, have targeted women, Latinos, blacks, Jews, and Muslims. In 
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Charlottesville, white supremacists and neo-Nazi groups carrying tiki-torches shouted that “Jews will 
not replace us” and “white lives matter.” In a government building adjacent to the Washington Mall, 
not long after the 2016 election, a salutation of “Hail Trump! Hail our people! Hail victory!” was 
answered by “Sieg Heil” salutes. At a recent rally, thousands feverishly chanted “send her back” in 
unison as the current President of the United States insulted Representative Ilhan Omar, a black 
Muslim woman, a refugee, and an immigrant. There are concentration camps in America. People die 
in these camps. Some of them are children. There is debate amongst Very Reasonable People as to 
how long they have been there. To paraphrase a line from the novelist Thomas Pynchon, “look out, it 
is getting pretty Fascist in here.”1 
 Many of us (a general, problematic “us”) are waking up to the realization that there are fascists 
all around. Perhaps, it is the fascists who are waking up to the realization that there is an authoritarian 
system already assembled and for the taking.  
For an entire generation of thinkers, the causes and nature of fascism was the Really Big 
Question that demanded critical attention. The names of the great thinkers of the last century, 
Gramsci, Reich, Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, and so many more, are forever coupled with this 
legacy. After the rise and fall of fascism, the imperative within the halls of academia was how to 
prevent its reemergence. Styled as warnings, this literature displayed a reckoning with the past that 
held grave consequence for the distant future.  
Emblematic of the genre is the Italian man of letters Umberto Eco’s essay “Ur-Fascism.”2 The 
prefix Ur refers to the ancient Sumerian city-state and is commonly used to conjure the earliest or 
original meaning of its referent. For Eco, it was necessary to speak of fascism as archetypal, precisely 
because it was ephemeral and indistinct. In the beginning, there was no such thing as fascism. The 
word was invented as a form of group identification.3 Then others appropriated the term, also calling 
themselves fascist. Not long after, this word resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of people.4 To 
think back upon this label was to acknowledge its contradictions, but also, to imagine its potentiality. 
Ur-Fascism does not merely refer to the index case, but to future cases and the process of 
metamorphosis. The first generation of fascism scholars recognized this, taking it as their vocation to 
disentangle fascist movements and their beliefs from the manifested representatives, Benito Mussolini 
and Adolf Hitler. The study of fascism is distinctively comparative.5 In the “Preface” to The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism, for example, Wilhelm Reich states that the motivation and significance of his 
study is “that there is a German, Italian, Spanish, Anglo-Saxon, Jewish, and Arabian fascism.”6  
In this essay, I most interested in the roots of American fascism. Whereas there were vibrant 
fascist movements in Britain, France, and Eastern Europe during the first half of the 20th century, 
many scholars have expressed shock at the lack of fascism in the United States.7 The comparativist 
approach is equally concerned with such counterfactuals. However, these scholars ignore American 
 
1 Thomas Pynchon. Gravity’s Rainbow. Viking: New York, NY. 1973. pg. 691. 
2 Umberto Eco. “Ur-Fascism.” The New York Review of Books. 1995. 
3 Italian fasci were political associations, the word meaning a “bundle of sticks.” 
4 In Sinclair Lewis’ 1935 novel, a character says to another: "Why are you so afraid of the word ‘Fascism,’ Doremus? Just a word—just a word!” (It Can’t 
Happen Here. Penguin: New York, NY. 1970. pg. 18).  
5 Juan J. Linz. “Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective.” Fascism: A Reader’s Guide – Analyses, 
Interpretations, Bibliography (ed. Walter Laqueur). University of California Press: Berkeley, CA. 1977.  
6 Wilhelm Reich. The Mass Psychology of Fascism. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: New York, NY. 1970. pg. xiv. 
7 Peter H. Amann. “A ‘Dog in the Nighttime’ Problem: American Fascism in the 1930s.” The History Teacher. Vol. 19, No. 4. 1986. 
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history and centuries of settler-colonial, racial, and imperial violence. It is an argument developed 
within this article that there is a distinct variety of star-spangled fascism.8 
Comparative explanations are simultaneously historical, confronting the paradox of how to 
compare politics of dissimilar epochs. The original is always unlike its future imitations. Eco 
translates Ur-Fascism as eternal fascism. He attempts to provide a framework for diagnosing future 
fascisms from the traits of monstrous forebearers. Eco’s Ur-Fascism is a warning about Neo-Fascism. 
As his fellow Italian, and survivor of the death camps, Primo Levi proclaimed, “Every age has its own 
Fascism.”9 The past many thought would never return surely does, and this insight necessitated a 
vigilance which animated the writings of those with a lived experience of fascism. The fear of future 
fascisms resulted in a paranoid policing of all manners of everyday-fascism and fascism-next-door. 
The hyperbolic imaginary is best exhibited in Michel Foucault’s observation that there is a “fascism in 
us all.”10 The American political scientist Richard Wolin later disparaged the sway that fascism 
maintained in the immediate aftermath of the war as an “intellectual romance.”11 The expression of 
terror by the first and second generations of fascism scholars bears some responsibility for the 
generalizable decline in the literature and a diminution in stakes. 
The third generation of scholars is synonymous with an analytical study of fascism. Fascism 
(like populism) is now derided as an ambiguous label that ought to be held in suspicion. George 
Orwell likened fascism to a meaningless swearword applied to everything from youth hostels to fox-
hunting and astrology.12 Fascism has become an unbounded pejorative, used merely to castigate. Such 
a propensity for concept inflation has tangible disadvantages; indistinct and overused the public has 
become cynical that fascism is still possible in the here and now.13 Scholars have become increasing 
wary of applying the term for fear of “crying wolf.” Added to this, present-day movements which 
could be labeled fascist disown the label, exploiting its woolliness. But as Ernest Hemingway’s 
protagonist Robert Jordan reminds, when asked why there are no American fascists: “There are many 
who do not know they are fascists, but will find it out when the time comes.”14 In response to the 
purported hollowness of the term, the analytical study of fascism has proclaimed a “new consensus,” 
espousing the notion of a “fascist minimum,” a thin method for establishing base conditions.15 The 
spokesman of the analytical school, Robert Griffin, characterizes the root ideology of all fascisms to 
be “palingenetic ultranationalism.”16 Palingenesis refers to calls for national reclamation. By renewing 
the analysis of fascism through the identification of political programs that share loose family 
resemblances, the new comparativist study of fascism does little more than repeat Eco’s originary 
wisdom. However, by tapering the label, something indispensable is omitted and fascism loses its 
import. 
The notion of a “fascist minimum” is an affront to the tens of millions who died. The fear of a 
fascist maximum is what underscored the hallowed reverence afforded the term. The establishment of 
 
8 Richard Steigmann-Gall. “Star-Spangled Fascism: American Interwar Political Extremism in Comparative Perspective.” Social History. Vol. 42. No. 1. 
2017.  
9 Primo Levi. “A Past We Thought Would Never Return.” The Black Hole of Auschwitz. Tr. Sharon Wood. Polity: Malden, MA. 2005. pg. 34.  
10 Michel Foucault. “Preface.” Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN. 1977. 
11 Richard Wolin. The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, NJ. 2004.  
12 George Orwell. “What is Fascism?” Tribune. London, UK. 1944. 
13 Gilbert Allardyce. “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept.” The American Historical Review. Vol. 84. No. 2. 1979. 
14 Ernest Hemingway. For Whom the Bell Tolls. Scribner: New York, NY. 1940. pg. 116.  
15  Roger Eatwell. “On Defining the ‘Fascist Minimum’: The Centrality of Ideology.” Journal of Political Ideologies. Vol. 1. No. 3. 1996. Roger Griffin. 
“Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age. From New Consensus to New Wave?” Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies. Vol. 1. No. 1. 2012. 
16 Roger Griffin. The Nature of Fascism. Routledge: London, UK. 1991. 
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ideological base conditions belies that the real danger of fascism is the machinations of organized 
mass death.   
The development and subsequent decline in the study of fascism has been an exercise in 
organized forgetting. As the collective memory of a prior generation fades, social amnesia sets in and 
fascist movements reappear. The counterpoint to the charge that fascism is a loaded word, easily 
abused, which has lost its meaning, is that the assumption of fascism as a spent force occasions its 
return. On this point, Félix Guattari once proclaimed: “We must abandon, once and for all, the quick 
and easy formula: ‘Fascism will not make it again.’ Fascism has already ‘made it,’ and it continues to 
‘make it.’”17 Many would have us disown the label and disfigure Theodor Adorno’s remark about 
poetry by asserting “there is no fascism after Auschwitz.” The juxtaposition of Ur-Fascism with Neo-
Fascism reveals the contradictions inherent in seeing the present in terms of the past. Present-day 
fascist movements are feeble imitations of their monstrous precursors. If the word fascism still holds 
purchase it is as a reminder of the monstrous and a lesson that catastrophe remains possible. Recalling 
the memory of the past is to wake the dead so that they might haunt the living. The contemporary 
conjuncture is trapped within this paradox: when fascists no longer use the label, as memories of 
cruelties become more distant, the rejoinder exhausts its power and forces of evil reappear.18 In an 
essay on the difficulties of using history for the study of politics, Adorno write of such a danger. 
“National Socialism lives on, and even today we still do not know whether it is merely the ghost of 
what was so monstrous that it lingers on after its own death, or whether it has not yet died at all, 
whether the willingness to commit the unspeakable survives in people as well as in the conditions that 
enclose them.”19 If the persistence of our memory of fascism helps incite the ferocity of a resistance 
against it, then a purpose of this essay is to reawaken the fascist imaginary which once captivated the 
first generations who wrote in the wake of calamity.   
 A final note on Umberto Eco’s essay. Ur-Fascism is also a theory of structural fascism. When 
Adorno spoke of unspeakable monstrosity surviving “in the conditions that enclose them” he refers to 
a fascism that all are complicit in and while seemingly dormant persists. Fascism is intimately linked 
with liberalism. The strains of capitalism and the fragility of democratic institutions were to blame for 
the rise of 20th century fascism. Fascism reveals the latent hypocrisy of liberal politics. If the danger of 
fascism is predicated upon its maximum potential, then the machinations of organized mass death by 
liberal states and authorized by liberal politicians ought be equally damned. 
The essay that follows is styled as a series of vignettes. The 2016 U.S. elections, along with the 
global rise of populist authoritarians and upsurge in economic nationalism, has occasioned a 
resurgence of popular and academic interest in the subject of fascism.20 This essay analyzes the 
reemergence of the specter of fascism within the field of international relations, particularly the 
subfield of international political economy. Particular attention is paid to (so-called) heterodox 
scholars who have been excluded and ignored by the discipline. William Robinson, for one, was 
warning his readers of the rise of 21st century fascism prior to the ascendency of Donald Trump. 
Robinson describes fascism as a political response to capitalist crisis. In the sections that follow, I 
 
17 Félix Guattari. “Everybody Wants to be a Fascist.” Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972–1977. Semiotext(e): Los Angeles, CA. 2009. pg. 171.  
18 Some argue on behalf of the term post-fascism because it exhibits the contradictory nature of the word. There is similarity between their position and 
mine. See: Enzo Traverso. The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right. Tr. David Broder. Verso: New York, NY. 2019.  
19 Theodor W. Adorno. “The Meaning of Working Through the Past.” Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Tr. Henry W. Pickford. Columbia 
University Press: New York, NY. 1998. pg. 89-90. 
20 William Connolly. Aspirational Fascism: The Struggle for Multifaceted Democracy under Trumpism. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 
MN. 2017. Jason Stanley. How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. Random House: New York, NY. 2018. Alexander Reid Ross. Against the 
Fascist Creep. AK Press: Chico, CA. 2017. Natasha Lennard. Being Numerous: Essays on Non-Fascist Life. Verso: London, UK. 2019.  
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expand upon, appraise, and complicate Robinson’s thesis. The decline of American empire, the 
reemergence of China as a great power, global capitalism, financial crisis, the liberal international 
order, historicism, and the role of ideas and organic intellectuals are significant subjects in which to 
analyze the current fascist conjuncture. The penultimate section is an extended excursus on various 
theories of fascism and their applicability for understanding current events. I conclude by means of a 
literary analysis of two anonymous texts, fashioning my own theory of structural fascism to resolve 
the paradox of Ur-Fascism and Neo-Fascism. I do not purport to determine whether fascism has 
returned. Further, I am uninterested in defining fascism, of saying what it is or what it is not. I am, on 
the contrary, invested in problematizing the legitimacy of analytical notions of fascism. Ur-Fascism 
and Neo-Fascism, 20th and 21st century fascisms, are essentially contradictory. By escaping the 
confines of a literature entrapped in historicism, we might imagine a future more terrifying than what 
has come before. These variations upon the theme of fascism are haunted by the vertigo of this 
thought. 
“His Coming was Expected on Earth”: Prophecies of Trump  
We must keep alert, so that the sense of these words will not be forgotten again. 
-Umberto Eco 
 The study of international political economy (IPE) has been confronting a crisis of hegemony. 
In his intellectual history of the subfield, Benjamin J. Cohen selects Susan Strange’s 1970 seminal 
article “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect” as the 
founding document.21 Four decades after Strange’s inaugural challenge, Cohen accused the now-
developed subfield of adherence to a new “dialogue of the deaf.”22 Calling attention to the 
“transatlantic divide” separating the American from the British schools of IPE was only the first step 
in unmasking an entrenched “monoculture.”23 As Cohen wryly retorts: “[T]the case for the inherent 
superiority of the American style of IPE is remarkably weak.”24  Much ink has been spilt on the 
shortcomings of the American school: methodological reductionism, econometric absolutism, 
disciplinary insularity, narrowness of topics, loss of ambition, boring content, impartiality and 
deference to authority, but none more so than an inability to predict or explain current events.25  
The third-wave of American school IPE has been labeled Open Economy Politics (OEP) by 
David Lake.26 Lake provocatively declares the OEP paradigm “a hegemonic approach.”27 The 
paradigm is a one-way, bottom-up methodology where national political institutions represent social 
interests at the international bargaining table. Excluded are structural or systemic theories, 
relationships of domination and dependence, and ideology. Parsimonious, provable explanations are 
valued over complexity. Historical analysis is shunned in favor of a rigorous scientific methodology. 
 
21 Susan Strange. “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect” International Affairs. Vol. 46. No. 2. 1970. Benjamin 
J. Cohen. International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 2008. 
22 Benjamin J. Cohen. “The Transatlantic Divide: Why are American and British IPE so Different?” Review of International Political Economy. Vol. 14. 
No. 2. 2007.  
23 Kathleen R. McNamara. “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE.” Review of International Political Economy. Vol. 16. No. 1. 2009.  
24 Benjamin J. Cohen. Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK. 2014. pg. 132. 
25 Susan Strange. “Cave! Hic Dragons: A Critique of Regime Analysis.” International Organization. Vol. 36. No. 2. 1982. Craig Murphy and Douglas 
Nelson. “International Political Economy: A Tale of Two Heterodoxies.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Vol. 3. No. 3. 2001. 
Nicola Philips and Catherine E. Weaver (eds.). International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present, and Future. Routledge: New York, NY. 2011. 
Thomas Oatley. “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy.” International Organization. Vol. 65. No. 2. 2011. W. 
Kindred Winecoff. “How Did American International Political Economy Become Reductionist? A Historiography of a Discipline.” Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics. 2017. Benjamin J. Cohen. “Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 54. 2010. 
26 David A. Lake. “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review.” Review of International Organizations. Vol. 4. No. 3. 2009. 
27 David A. Lake. “International Political Economy: A Maturing Interdiscipline.” Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (eds. Barry Weingast and 
Donald Wittman). Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. 2006. pg. 772. 
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Interests are endogenous and can be properly accounted for. Actors and institutions are honest brokers. 
If the first generation of modern IPE focused upon the decline of state power and the rise of 
multinational corporations, OEP has retained little of that legacy. Instead, the third-wave has adopted 
the two weakest aspects of realism and liberalism: the nation-state is the central unit of analysis and 
economic liberalism is ultimately advantageous.  
The publication of Cohen’s invective, alongside the 2008 financial crisis, turned received 
wisdom on its head. The subprime mortgage crisis, global in scope and contagious across borders, 
arrived without notice and undercut the central dogmas of economists. Cohen argued that the inability 
of IPE scholars to see the crisis looming demonstrated a “grave case of myopia.”28 The British school, 
spearheaded by Susan Strange, was far more attuned to changes in the global economy and the 
corresponding dangers. Strange’s books, Casino Capitalism, The Retreat of the State, and Mad 
Money, now read as warnings.29 Ronen Palan argued that the prejudices and rigidity of the orthodoxy 
within IPE blinded them to the hazards of economic liberalism. Arguing that the “proof of the pudding 
is in the eating,” the 2008 financial crisis undermined the credibility of the American school.30  
If the 2008 financial crisis undercut the competence of American school IPE, the 2016 election 
of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States (along with Britain’s Brexit vote and the global 
rise of authoritarian populists) exposed the bankruptcy of the school of thought. As Mark Blyth and 
Matthias Matthijs claim, the financial crisis was no “black swan,” rather IPE is a “lame duck” research 
agenda.31 The multi-decade, bipartisan, international, and academic consensus in favor of free trade 
and capital mobility is kaput.  
Not everyone was caught unaware. A pronounced, prescient example is William Robinson, one 
of the originators of the global capitalism school, who accurately predicted the emergence of 21st 
century fascism several years before Trump descended to the political stage.32 One never needed to 
cross the Atlantic to illustrate how critical approaches were disregarded by the orthodox branch of 
IPE. Robinson, along with a motley crew of academic outcasts, are examples of what Craig Murphy 
called America’s “left-out,” scholars whose critical and left-leaning insights have been refused entry 
or reply in the leading IPE journals.33 Robinson is a successor to Robert Cox and the Neo-Gramscian 
school of international relations.34 While formally included in the British school within Cohen’s 
intellectual history of the subfield, Cox was not British, nor did he teach there, and, furthermore, was 
responsible for promoting a tradition distinct from Strange. As part of the second-wave of Neo-
Gramscian thinkers, the global capitalism school is most notable for advancing the study of 
globalization and the ascendency of a transnational capitalist class.35  
 
28 Benjamin J. Cohen. “A Grave Case of Myopia.” International Interactions. Vol. 35. No. 4. 2009. 
29 Susan Strange. Casino Capitalism. Basil Blackwell: Oxford, UK. 1986. Susan Strange. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 1996. Susan Strange. Mad Money: When Markets Outgrow Governments. Manchester 
University Press: Manchester, UK. 1998.  
30 Ronen Palan. “The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: IPE in Light of the Crisis of 2007/8.” New Political Economy. Vol. 14. No. 3. 2009.  
31 Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs. “Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the Mystery of IPE’s Missing Macro-Economy.” Review of International Political 
Economy. Vol. 24. No. 2. 2017.  
32 William I. Robinson and Mario Barrera. “Global Capitalism and Twenty-first Century Fascism: a US Case Study.” Race & Class. Vol. 53. No. 3. 2012. 
William I. Robinson. Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 2014. 
33 Craig N. Murphy. “Do the Left-Out Matter?” New Political Economy. Vol. 14. No. 3. 2009. 
34 Robert W. Cox. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. Columbia University Press: New York, NY. 1987. 
Stephen Gill. Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 1993. 
35 Robinson is similarly influenced by another neo-Gramscian thinker: Stuart Hall. Hall provides a more nuanced analysis of (British) domestic politics 
and police repression than does Cox.  
The Journal of 
International Relations, Peace and Development Studies 
A publication by Arcadia University and the American Graduate School in Paris 
      
101, boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris – France Tel: +33(0)1 47 20 00 94 – Fax: +33 (0)1 47 20 81 89 Website: https://scholarworks.arcadia.edu/agsjournal/ 
(Please cite this paper as the following: Andrew Johnson (2019). Ur-Fascism and Neo-Fascism. The Journal of International Relations, Peace and 
Development Studies. Volume 5.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Page	7 
 
An alternative choice that Cohen could have highlighted as the founding act of IPE was a 1970 
conference held at Harvard University on “Transnational Relations and World Politics.”36 Here at the 
birth pangs of the nascent discipline new actors such as multinational corporations, financial investors, 
and private foundations were identified as challenges to the analytical primacy and democratic 
processes of nation-states. Marxist thinkers were included in these early debates. Nearly fifty years 
later, even though transnational relations and the power of multinational corporations serve as the 
bedrocks of the global capitalism school, and their work has amassed citations, the “left-out” are no 
longer even a niche in a vast network of IPE scholarship.37  
The question bears asking: why has the modern school of American IPE excised the study of 
transnational relations which the pioneering generation put as the foundation? The OEP paradigm has 
failed to live up to its promise of “theoretical eclecticism” and now suffers from a theoretical deficit.38 
Cohen himself once playfully depicted Marxists as “outside the ‘respectable’ mainstream of Western 
scholarship,” while also applauding the current academic environment for encouraging free expression 
and allowing “radicals” to speak openly without censure.39 Cox’s remembrance of the climate was 
quite different: “Cold-war ideologies had a powerful impact upon scholarship. Any suspicion of 
Marxism is anathema… Marxism appears to thinkers in the mainstream as a manifestation of 
dissidence, obstinate ignorance, even treachery.”40 The ascendency of neoliberal ideology 
corresponded with a need for organic intellectuals to defend free enterprise and economic 
globalization. Hegemony entails the institutionalization of the ruling ideas. As Karl Marx reminds us: 
“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.”41 American school IPE mimicked 
American global hegemony by systematically discouraging dissensus, through gatekeeping, 
standardization, conformity, and good ole-fashioned disregard. If IPE suffers from a bankruptcy of 
ideas, this signals a more general failure of governing ideology. As Cox once proclaimed, “a 
proliferation of loners is an indicator of crisis in received opinion, perhaps even a crisis of 
hegemony.”42 
Thinkers of the global capitalism school are not “fuzzy thinkers,” nor “navel gazers,” and 
certainly not “treacherous ignorant dissidents” either; rather, they are indispensable. That Robinson 
was prescient when so many of his colleagues were oblivious calls for a critical appraisal of his 
foretelling of 21st century fascism. As IPE attempts to grapple with the Trump Presidency, the 
reemergence of economic nationalism and authoritarian populists, trade wars, and escalating class 
conflict, the theories and lessons of the formerly outcast must be given pride of place. 
The purported return of fascism is an extreme accusation. Given the historical baggage of the 
charge, one can hardly lay the blame on IPE for not giving it attention. The entire discipline of 
political science, along with political elites, failed to anticipate the Trump phenomenon and has spent 
the past years immobilized and in anticipation of what comes next. Political science has overestimated 
 
36 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (eds.). Transnational Relations and World Politics. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 1972.  
37 Leonard Seabrooke and Kevin L. Young. “The Networks and Niches of International Political Economy.” Review of International Political Economy. 
Vol. 24. No. 2. 2017.  
38 David A. Lake. “Why ‘Isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.” International 
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 55. No. 2. 2011. David Lake. “Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in 
International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 19. No. 3. 2013.  
39 Cohen 2007. pg. 197. Cohen 2008. pg. 136. 
40 Robert W. Cox. “The ‘British School’ in the Global Context.” New Political Economy. Vol. 14. No. 3. 2009.  
41 Karl Marx. “The German Ideology.” The Marx-Engels Reader. W.M. Norton & Company: New York, NY. 1978. pg. 172.  
42 Robert W. Cox. “’Take Six Eggs’: Theory, Finance, and the Real Economy in the Work of Susan Strange.” Approaches to World Order. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, UK. 1996. 
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the sturdiness and merit of institutions.43 However, the study of far-right parties and populism has 
been an intensifying fascination amongst those in comparative politics and economic inequality and 
race are commanding subjects within the field of American politics.44 International relations is unique 
for the widespread fealty shown to liberal assurances of peace and prosperity. The optimism shared 
amongst co-signers of the previous hegemonic consensus felt that the boom-times could last in 
perpetude. Myopic and ineffectual, those studying the global economy and global political dynamics 
lacked a pessimistic imagination. 
In the twilight of the Obama presidency, Robinson forecast a set of three possibilities for a 
time of acute crisis: 1) a reformism from above that strives to stabilize the global capitalist system, 2) 
a leftist resistance from below, 3) the emergence of 21st century fascism. Whereas the first was already 
in power, its hold on hegemony was precarious. The least likely option was the second, as a 
democratic socialist alternative had not yet announced itself. The most likely was the third possibility, 
as Robinson announced that 21st century fascism was already emergent.  
The conclusions of Robert Cox’s essays were always formulaic. At the end of each, he 
proposes a set of alternative futures. His most lauded essay, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations,” predicts a new world order based upon the internationalization of 
production. Leading countries and international organizations would unite in a common effort to 
promote global capital. The lasting legacy of Cox’s career was foreseeing the emergence of neoliberal 
globalization. The Coxian formula also considered less likely scenarios, one being the revival of 
nationalism and mercantilism. States could reimpose their authority over domestic markets, monetary 
policy, and cross-border flows. The least likely possibility, but the one Cox was most supportive of, 
was a counter-hegemonic coalition of Third World countries and/or global social movements.45 Cox 
was a resolute futurist; he employed this formula before and would repeat it after.46 The model is a 
hallmark of Neo-Gramscian theory, as British cultural theorist Stuart Hall analyzed the 1) neoliberal 
“law and order” state, 2) the social-democratic “solution,” and the 3) looming appearance of 
“authoritarian populism.”47 As Cox warned: “The danger of authoritarian populism, of reborn fascism, 
is particularly great where political structures are crumbling and the material basis of resentment 
appears to be intractable.”48 Robinson’s prophetic powers are less impressive upon recognizing that 
his Neo-Gramscian forebearers had been announcing the arrival of fascism generations prior. A 
globalized economy limits the range of political choices. There were two alternatives to the neoliberal 
consensus: an inclusive global socialism from below or neo-fascism. Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal 
adage There is No Alternative is illustrative of the economic orthodoxy of the time, but also reveals 
why political elites, upon the breakdown of this consensus, would adhere to authoritarianism as a 
bulwark against popular movements. As the distribution of gains and loses intensifies, engendering 
severe inequalities and social upheaval, capital has no alternative but to rely upon fascism to maintain 
the privilege of unregulated financial markets and the wholesale privatization of public goods.  
 
43 Laurel Eckhouse. “White Riot: Race, Institutions, and the 2016 U.S. Election.” Politics, Groups, and Identities. 2018. 
44 On populism, see: Cas Mudde. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 2007. On economic inequality 
and race, see: Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. “American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality.” American Political Science 
Association. 2004. Task Force on Racial and Social Class Inequalities in the Americas. “The Double Bind: The Politics of Racial & Class Inequalities in 
the Americas.” American Political Science Association. 2016. 
45 Robert W. Cox. “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations.” Millennium: A Journal of International Studies. Vol. 10. 
No. 2. 1981.   
46 Robert W. Cox. “On Thinking about Future World Order.” World Politics. Vol. 28. No. 2. 1976. Robert W. Cox. “The Global Political Economy and 
Social Choice.” The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power (eds. Daniel Drache and Meric Gertler). McGill-Queen’s University 
Press: Montreal, CA. 1991. Robert W. Cox. “Multilateralism and World Order.” Review of International Studies. Vol. 18. No. 2.  1992. 
47 Stuart Hall. “Popular-Democratic vs Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of ‘Taking Democracy Seriously.’” Hard Road to Renewal Thatcherism and 
the Crisis of the Left. Verso: London, UK. 1988.  
48 Robert W. Cox. “Global perestroika.” Socialist Register. Vol. 12. 1992.  
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To its adherents the advantage of the global capitalism school is its “nuanced empirically based 
analysis.”49 The promise of the approach is not empirics, nor its novelty, comprehensiveness, 
consistency, or even radicalness, but its power of prediction. If Robinson exhibits a weak messianic 
power, it is, as Walter Benjamin posits, shared with prior generations and structured by our memories 
of the past.50 The fascist messiah, whose coming was expected on earth, is always-already present. 
Donald Trump is the augur of resurgent fascism. Though proleptic, Robinson’s theory of 21st 
century fascism suffers from its reliance upon historicism. Robinson’s account of fascism is dependent 
upon a crisis-consensus. Robinson asserts that the principal cause of fascism, in both the 20th and 21st 
centuries, is capitalist crisis. Robinson ignores other sufficient causes of fascism such as global power 
transitions, imperial aspirations, uniquely malevolent leaders, and democratic backsliding. 
Furthermore, Robinson labels 21st century fascism as emergent, but does not describe the life-cycle of 
fascist movements. Studying fascism-in-motion shows how emergence can become consolidation. 
Disassembling the temporal theories of fascism holds important implications for what I call dormant-
fascism and fascism-without-end. Robinson’s thesis is limited because of the constraints he places on 
the present by understanding it through the past. An underlying premise forming my own thoughts is 
that politics is never reducible to the structural settings in which it occurs.  
American Empire and Global Capitalism 
It would be so much easier, for us, if there appeared on the world scene somebody saying,  
“I want to reopen Auschwitz, I want the Black Shirts to parade again in the Italian squares.” 
-Umberto Eco 
 The myth of fading American empire eternally recurs.51 The invasion of Iraq and 
neoconservative unilateralism gave rise to fears of waning American influence and the rise of soft 
balancing.52 Some predicted that the 2008 financial crisis marked the date American hegemony 
deteriorated.53 Most recently, the election of Donald Trump has produced a new wave of hand-
wringing over the coming collapse of Pax Americana.54 The paragon of the trope is Christopher 
Layne, whose academic career has centered upon the impermanence of unipolarity and a recurring 
prophecy that “this time it’s real.”55 The cyclical warnings of impending hegemonic decline have 
become repetitive, inaccurate, and feigned.56   
 
49 William I. Robinson. A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World. John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 
MD. 2004. Jeb Sprague. “Empire, Global Capitalism, and Theory: Reconsidering Hardt and Negri.” Current Perspectives in Social Theory. Vol. 29. 
2011. 
50 Walter Benjamin. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Illuminations. Tr. Harry Zohn. Schocken Books: New York, NY. 1968. 
51 Bruce Russett. “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?” International Organization. Vol. 39. No. 2. 1985. 
Susan Strange. “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony.” International Organization. Vol. 41. No. 4. 1987.  
52 Michael Cox. “The Empire’s Back in Town: or America’s Imperial Temptation – Again.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 32. No. 1. 
2003. Robert A. Pape. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security. Vol. 30. No. 1. 2005. Stephen M. Walt. Taming American 
Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, NY. 2006.   
53 Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford Delong. The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money. Basic Books: New York, NY. 
2010. Robert J. Art. “Selective Engagement in an Era of Austerity.” America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration (eds. Robert Fontaine 
and Kristin Lord). Center for a New American Security: Washington D.C. 2012.  
54 David A. Lake. “International Legitimacy Lost? Rule and Resistance when America is First.” Perspective on Politics. Vol. 16. No. 1. 2018. Alfred W. 
McCoy. “The World According to Trump: Or How to Build a Wall and Lose an Empire.” TomDispatch. 2018.  
55 Christopher Layne. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.” International Security. Vol. 17. No. 3. 1993. Christopher Layne. “The 
Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment.” International Security. Vol. 31. No. 2. 2006. Christopher Layne. 
“This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 56. No. 1. 2012. Christopher Layne. “The 
US–Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana.” International Affairs. Vol. 91. No. 1. 2018. 
56 Paul K. MacDonald. “Those who Forget Historiography are Doomed to Republish it: Empire, Imperialism and Contemporary Debates about American 
Power.” Review of International Studies. Vol. 35. 2009. 
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 The failure to accurately predict hegemonic decline demands we ask a more fascinating 
question: why has American empire endured?57 Overstretched and irresponsible, fraudulent and 
coercive, capricious and derided, military adventurism, financial recklessness, and political 
malfeasance has not damaged the United States’ global power. Some argue that American hegemony 
endures based upon its monopoly on the capacity to project military force.58 Others endorse effective 
use of strategic restraint, retrenchment, and soft power for winning friends, influencing foes, and 
maintaining legitimacy.59 Worth remembering is Susan Strange’s proverb in the first iteration of this 
debate: “America’s ‘legions’... are not military but economic.”60 The U.S. dollar and American 
markets paradoxically provided safe haven in the aftermath of the 2008 financial collapse. Far from 
overextended, the reach, capabilities, and position of American economic power has elicited 
accommodation and collaboration. The U.S. policy of military Keynesianism presides on a substratum 
of perpetual deficits without tears. The imperial command of the global commons rests upon economic 
foundations.    
 The liberal international order is based upon an ideology of economic openness, multilateral 
cooperation, and unrestrained investment, extraction, and production. American unipolarity persists 
through alliance systems, international institutions, and widespread acquiescence. Neo-Marxists have 
castigated the liberal international order as a new type of imperialism.61 The global capitalism school 
holds that preponderant American power conceals the totalizing dominance of a transnational 
capitalist class. The purported hegemony of the transnational capitalist class was intended as a 
supplement to the eras of successive bids for global hegemony by nation-states. The hegemonic 
decline thesis ignores the convergence of global elites around a shared project of expansive capitalism. 
Harkening back to Strange, the history of the present was foretold: “What is emerging is a non-
territorial empire with its imperial capital in Washington D.C.”62    
 One reason for the staying-power of American empire is the lack of geopolitical rivals.63 The 
reemergence of China as a great power has precipitated a growing debate over their intentions and 
ambitions.64 Is China a revisionist state, or will it preserve the status quo; is Beijing a taker, maker, or 
breaker of the existing order?65    
 
57 Evidence of hegemonic power is that the word “American” is readily understood to refer to the United States and not the Americas (both North and 
South). A grave sin of this essay is that “American” is used so freely. 
58 Barry R. Posen. “The Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony.” International Security. Vol. 28. No. 1. 2003. 
59 G. John Ikenberry. After Victory: Intuitions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Orders after Major Wars. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 
NJ. 2000. Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment.” International Security. 
Vol. 35. No. 4. 2011.  
60 Susan Strange. “The Future of American Empire.” Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 42. No. 1. 1988.  
61 Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy. America’s Quest for Supremacy in the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis. Pinter Publishers: London, UK. 
1989. Ellen Meiksins Wood. Empire of Capital. Verso: London, UK. 2003. David Harvey. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. 
2005. Greg Grandin. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. Henry Holt: New York, NY. 2007. 
Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US 
Geopolitics.” Critical Sociology. Vol. 37. No. 4. 2010. Leo Panitich and Sam Gindin. The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of 
American Empire. Vero: London, UK. 2013.  
62 Susan Strange. “Towards a Theory of Transnational Empire.” Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s 
(eds. Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau). Lexington Books: Lexington, KY. 1989. 
63 Full-spectrum global dominance is impossible. American empire is maintained with the cooperation of its allies, particularly in Europe and Japan. For 
example, Russia remains a regional hegemon and has successfully challenged the international liberal order in Georgia and Ukraine. 
64 David C. Kang. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia. Columbia University Press: New York, NY. 2007. 
65 Alastair Iain Johnston. “Is China a State Quo Power?” International Security. Vol. 27. No. 4. 2003. Thomas J. Christensen. “Fostering Stability or 
Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia.” International Security. Vol. 31. No. 1. 2006. Michael Beckley. “China’s 
Century: Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security. Vol. 36. No. 3. 2012. Benjamin J. Cohen. “The China Question: Can Its Rise be 
Accommodated?” The Great Wall of Money: Power and Politics in China’s International Monetary Relations (eds. Jonathan Kirschner and Eric 
Helleiner). Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 2014. Stephen G. Brook and William Wohlforth. “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-
first Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position.” International Security. Vol. 40. No. 3. 2016.  
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 The rise of China has proven to be empirically puzzling for the global capitalism school. The 
bulk of their in-depth empirical studies have focused on the transnational capitalist class and Latin 
America.66 High-growth rates in China have paralleled four decades of growth in East Asia. China is a 
one-stop shop situated amidst a continent of cheap labor.67 Added to this is the difficulty of evaluating 
China’s status as an autocratic regime, the continued presence and magnitude of state-owned 
enterprises, and restrictions on capital mobility. China rejects the basic tenets of liberalism, remaining 
nominally a communist government.    
 Jeb Sprague has produced one of the first studies by the global capitalism school on East 
Asia.68 In this volume, Jerry Harris posits the establishment of a “statist transnational capital class” in 
China.69 Foreign direct investment into China has come predominately from other countries in the 
region: Japan and the four Asian Tigers. Despite strict controls on capital mobility, Chinese capitalists 
access offshore financial centers through Macau and Hong Kong. As Anthony van Fossen states, 
“Hong Kong is not just a tax haven. It is a bridge to a labyrinth of other [offshore financial centers].”70 
The vast majority of the illicit financial flows in the region originate from China. William Robinson 
provides the definitive statement on the supposed challenge to American empire by the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).71 None of the emerging economies have diversified 
their economies or developed higher value-added industries. Brazil remains an agricultural exporter, 
Russia an energy exporter, India a hub for services, and China a supplier for mass manufacturing. 
While Robinson underestimates the diversification of the Chinese economy and production of capital-
intensive goods, far from rejecting globalization, these countries have sought out foreign investment, 
worked to weaken labor and land rights, and opened their territories and peoples to corporate 
colonization.  
 Sean Starrs provides evidence that American firms continue to dominate the global economy 
and that American investors own large shares of Chinese companies.72 Starrs summons the data on 
transnational corporations, corporate ownership, and sectoral dominance, and from this draws a set of 
conclusions intended to challenge the global capitalism school. The American economy remains 
dominate, across sectors and by a significant margin. Chinese firms maintain an inferior position in 
buyer-driven global supply chains and are thoroughly penetrated by foreign capital. Chinese economic 
growth benefits foreign investors. The Chinese economy is powered by state-owned enterprises, 
whose corporate owners owe allegiance to the party and serve on central committees. Starrs takes this 
to imply the predominant role of the state in the Chinese economy.  
 Starrs has demanded that we take globalization and the state seriously.73 By focusing on 
corporate ownership, Starrs has replicated the methods of the global capitalism school. However, his 
 
66 William I. Robinson. Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Prospective. John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD. 
2008. 
67 Dae-oup Chang. “From Global Factory to Continent of Labor.” Asian Labor Review. Vol. 1. 2015.  
68 Jeb Sprague (ed). Globalization and Transnational Capitalism in Asia and Oceania. Routledge: New York, NY. 2016. 
69 Jerry Harris. “Statist Globalization in Russia, China, and the Gulf States.” Science & Society. Vol. 73. No. 1. 2009. Jerry Harris. “Outward Bound: 
Transnational Capitalism in China.” Race & Class. Vol. 54. No. 1. 2012.  
70 Anthony van Fossen. “Offshore Tax Havens: The Borderlands of Global Capitalism.” Globalization and Transnational Capitalism in Asia and Oceania 
(ed. Jeb Sprague). Routledge: New York, NY. 2016. 
71 William I. Robinson. “Global Capitalism, the BRICS, and the Transnational State.” Globalization and Transnational Capitalism in Asia and Oceania 
(ed. Jeb Sprague). Routledge: New York, NY. 2016. 
72 Sean K. Starrs. “American Economic Power Hasn’t Declined – It Globalized! Summoning the Data and Taking Globalization Seriously.” International 
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 57. No. 4. 2013. Sean K. Starrs. “The Global Capitalism School Tested in Asia: Transnational Capitalist Class vs Taking the State 
Seriously.” Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 47. No. 4. 2017.  
73 The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once warned of those preaching seriousness: “How burdensome they must find good thinking! The lovely human 
beast always seems to lose its good spirits when it thinks well; it becomes ‘serious’… Well then, let us prove that this is a prejudice” (The Gay Science. 
Tr. Walter Kaufman. Vintage: New York, NY. 1974. pg. 257).  
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analysis of sectors utilizes national economic indicators. Harris asks the fundamental question: “When 
Nigerian oil powers the assembly lines at Honda and Volkswagen, or Iranian energy lights up 
FoxConn so computers for Dell and [Hewlett Packard] can flow off the assembly line, just who is 
benefiting?”74 Capitalism-with-Chinese-characteristics is nationally determined, globally integrated, 
and permeated by foreign investors. That corporate executives serve on the central committees of the 
Chinese Communist Party demonstrates the influence of globally-oriented market actors on public 
policy and governance. Starrs does not address Beijing’s support of the liberal international order and 
economic globalization.75 If Starrs’s contribution is the supremacy of an American capitalist class, he 
knowingly proves its transnational constitution. Robinson has repeated, ad nauseum, his position that 
global capitalism is organized by the United States and that capitalists and elites in the Global South 
are incorporated as subsidiaries. Starrs’s general findings of American economic dominance reinforce 
the conclusions reached by the global capitalism school.76  
 Like many who assert the mantle of seriousness, Starrs substitutes data for the rigor of theory. 
He misrepresents the global capitalism school. To be fair, basic misunderstandings are due to the 
school’s theoretical ambiguity. The global capitalism school wants it both ways: to posit the 
predominance of American global power, while emphasizing the hegemony of the transnational 
capitalist class.      
For Robinson, “Trumpism is not a departure from but an incarnation of an emerging 
dictatorship of the transnational capitalist class.”77 Accordingly, economic nationalism is a campaign 
tactic that belies an agenda based upon the intensification of neoliberalism. While Trump is a member 
of the transnational capitalist class, whose global business empire has thrived because of the economic 
policies he criticizes, Trump does not represent the capitalist elites any more than he is a puppet of 
Vladimir Putin or contained by the Republican party. Trump represents nobody’s interest but his own, 
a distinguishing aspect of fascist leaders. Trump’s ongoing trade wars are not symbolic but hedged 
upon the “exorbitant privilege” of American economic power. Political support for economic 
nationalism is increasing not waning, domestically, internationally, and across the ideological 
spectrum, threatening existing supply chains and globally-oriented businesses.  
 The “Make America Great Again” slogan reinforces the myth of fading American empire. The 
politics of international trade has electoral consequences. Manufacturing industries are concentrated in 
swing states and the two most populated states are border states.78 Trump appealed to domestic 
interests in favor of economic nationalism.79  What was distinctive was how Trump framed the issue 
in terms of geopolitical rivalry. As President, Trump has pursued a global trade war, against China, 
but also Mexico, Brazil, and even European allies, not out of fears of hegemonic decline, but to 
leverage American economic supremacy. “Make American Great Again” appeals to domestic 
 
74 Jerry Harris. “Statism and the Transnational Capitalist Class in China.” Globalization and Transnational Capitalism in Asia and Oceania (ed. Jeb 
Sprague). Routledge: New York, NY. 2016. pg. 27. 
75 A brief example, in a keynote speech at the World Economic Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated: “the problems troubling the world are not 
caused by economic globalization.” 
76 Marcelo del Castillo-Mussot, Jeb Sprague, and Alfredo de la Lama Garcia. “Global Capitalism and ‘North-South’ Unevenness: In Light of Ranking, 
Statistical Correlations, and Profits from the Forbes’ Worldwide List of 2000 Top Firms.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology. Vol. 12. 
2013. 
77 William I. Robinson. “Trumpism, 21st-Century Fascism, and the Dictatorship of the Transnational Capitalist Class.” Social Justice: A Journal of 
Crime, Conflict, and World Order. 2017.  
78 J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. “Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting.” 
International Organization. Vol. 71. No. 3. 2017.  
79 Political scientists have identified the activation of racial resentment as a counterpoint to those who posit that economic anxieties mobilized voters. It 
was both/and. Xenophobia animates the rhetoric aimed at Trump’s two foremost geopolitical foes: China and Mexico.  
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audiences longing for a mythic, fleeting past, but an “America First” foreign policy is enacted to 
“weaponize interdependence.”80  
Trade theory remains mired in a methodology that emphasizes national factor endowments.81 
Industrial cleavages, factor mobility, and trading blocs do not account for the preponderance of intra-
firm trade. If IPE’s really big question concerns the political determinants of globalization, then the 
answer by the OEP paradigm is a detailed description of domestic politics. This answer is 
diametrically opposed to the conclusions reached about the intensification of finance and capital 
mobility by the second-generation of American school IPE.82 The global diffusion of liberalism 
benefits globally-oriented businesses at the expense of nationally-oriented businesses and the decision-
making autonomy of politicians. The global capitalism school argues that the transnational capitalist 
class is afforded tremendous autonomy and controlling influence over institutions, leaders, policy, and 
regulation, thereby holding structural power over nation-states. The intensification of intra-firm trade 
indicates that national growth-rates conceal that an overwhelming proportion of profits goes to 
multinational firms best positioned within global supply chain networks. Trade wars diminish the 
profit-margins of capitalists and threaten the globalization of the production process.   
Capital and high-wage earners can move freely across borders, whereas low-wage laborers 
cannot. Trump appeals to the working class by directing animus and resentment towards foreign 
workers, immigrant labor, and geopolitical competitors. Robinson is correct that Trump has intensified 
neoliberalism. However, Robinson is incorrect to dismiss Trump’s trade war. The global capitalism 
school has too eagerly ignored the persistence of geopolitical rivalry as a bygone relic. National 
political elites retain a high-degree of autonomy from and control over the transnational state 
apparatus. The Trump regime is not pursuing belligerent economic nationalism solely because it plays 
well domestically. “Weaponizing interdependence” is based upon the hedge that American owners of 
capital can more easily withstand loses and exploit new opportunities for extraction. During the 1980s, 
President Ronald Reagan was able to depreciate the dollar and pressure Germany and Japan into trade 
concessions.83 Economic conflict and protectionist rhetoric do not necessarily impede heightened 
global integration. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Belt 
Road Initiative prove that geopolitical rivalry and the intensification of transnational capitalism easily 
coexist.  
One explanation for the rise of fascism is power transition theory. As the hegemonic power 
Britain declined in strength, a revisionist Germany reacted aggressively. Modern-day inter-imperialist 
rivalry is unique because America is not threatened with hegemonic decline. Even though some 
presume great power wars have gone extinct, no country or combination of countries could currently 
oppose aggressive American military expansion. The United States has waged a perpetual World War 
since the end of the last one. Previous U.S. Presidents have openly supported genocide and military 
expansion without being as effortlessly labeled fascist. There are diminishing checks on a unilateral 
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executive determined to make “low-intensity conflicts” become “total war.”84 Worth noting is that 
Trump has chosen, instead, economic conflict together with retrenchment.  
 Equally surprising as the election of Trump in 2016 was the primary challenge by Bernie 
Sanders, a self-avowed socialist and one of the leading contenders to challenge Trump in the 2020 
election. Neither Sanders nor Trump identified with the political parties they sought the nomination of, 
both were dismissed by corporate media, and each sought to reverse the dominant consensus. The next 
section will focus more closely upon Sanders’ framing of economic nationalism through class conflict. 
However, it is important to recognize that Sanders, while defending the benefits of international 
cooperation, also relies upon the rhetoric of geopolitical rivalry, especially when it comes to China. 
On the issue of trade, Sanders has repeatedly supported revoking China’s most favored nation status. 
For those who assume that Trump’s trade war is merely symbolic, or that a new regime will reverse 
tariffs, it must be emphatically pointed out that a bipartisan consensus has formed in Washington D.C. 
on behalf of a hardline approach towards Beijing.85 In an era of intractable gridlock, Congress has 
passed multiple bills targeting China. Once introduced, protectionist policies and nationalist rhetoric 
are not easily reversed. The struggle against fascism does not exclude a future of increased economic 
nationalism and cascading trade disputes. 
Never-ending Crisis and the Messianism of Ideas   
Ur-Fascism is still around us, sometimes in plainclothes. 
-Umberto Eco 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008 struck at the epicenter of the 
American financial system but did not upend American unipolar supremacy. Paradoxically, the origin 
of the crisis became the refuge during and after. The most inscrutable finding of Sean Starrs research 
is the continued global dominance of American economic power after the 2008 financial crisis. The 
typical response of American school IPE is that the system worked.86 Most praise U.S. leadership 
during the crisis: by acting as a benevolent hegemon the system was stabilized. Far from triggering 
hegemonic decline, American empire was “too big to fail.”87   
Political scientists argue that crisis leads to change. Benjamin J. Cohen separates good crises 
from bad.88 Good crises pose opportunities for broad reform though concerted collective action. Bad 
crises signify the plausible danger that there will be no meaningful reform of the status quo. After 
failing to predict the crash of the financial system, it was felt that the crisis would lead to a political 
realignment. Instead of the transformative changes many predicted, the aftermath of the financial crisis 
was remarkable in how little things changed. The crisis was characterized by the endurance of the 
status quo.89 Prematurely, Andrew Gamble claimed that the lack of a populist resurgence is proof that 
the 2008 crisis did not produce a political realignment.90 
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2018.  
86 Daniel W. Drezner. “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession.” World Politics. Vol. 66. No. 1. 2014. 
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Logics of Global Finance. Hannover, Germany. 2015.  
89 Eric Helleiner. The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance after the 2008 Meltdown. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. 2014. 
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The principal means of change are norms and ideas. Ideas are roadmaps for achieving 
objectives.91 Norms emerge, and upon reaching a tipping point, cascade, eventually becoming 
internalized.92 For Jeffrey Chwieroth, crises lead to change through experimentation with new ideas 
and eventual consolidation.93 New ideas need entrepreneurial carriers, crossover appeal, and 
credibility. There is correlation between theories of power transition and political realignments.94 
Within both schools of thought, legitimation crises necessitate the emergence of new ideas and 
political principals. The great failing of the crisis-change model is its reliance upon historicism and the 
messianic power conferred upon ideas. New ideas are expected, but never arrive. Ideas are afforded a 
spiritual power without a material basis. Capital holds structural power over political elites, and 
political elites retain legal domination over social forces. Fascism is the intensification of capitalism 
without the impediment of having to win consent or manufacture legitimacy. Global power transitions 
and political realignments are never predestined. Despite the appearance of patterns or historical 
analogies, history unfolds stochastically not cyclically. While political change is a focal topic within 
international relations, also needed are theories that explain endurance and systemic collapse.  
William Robinson argues that there are three types of crisis: cyclical, structural, and 
systematic. While conventional interpretations blame the 2008 financial crisis on financial complexity, 
lax regulations, or fiscal imbalances, Robinson emphasizes overaccumulation as the root cause. The 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of a small number of billionaires generates shortages in demand 
and an inability to offload surplus commodities. For Robinson, 2008 portended a structural, possibly 
systemic, crisis.95 Neither transparency nor increased regulation, stimulus nor austerity, are suitable 
remedies. Without addressing the structural contradiction of economic inequality, systemic collapse 
becomes increasingly likely.  
The collapse of the financial system revealed the magnitude of economic inequality and the 
acquiescence of political elites to capital interests, undermining the legitimacy of neoliberal 
ideology.96 The common sense underwriting global capitalism is no longer believed, but still 
hegemony endures. The emergence of populist alternatives to neoliberal elites is taken as proof of an 
ongoing political realignment. Despite the prevalence of this thesis, the role of the 2008 financial crisis 
in the minds of voters during the 2016 election has not been tested with the same rigor as trade 
cleavages or racial resentment.97  
As was said of Benito Mussolini, Donald Trump has no ideology. While positioning himself in 
opposition to neoliberal ideas and elites, Trump’s rhetoric aims to generate affective contagion and is 
uninterested in persuading audiences to coalesce around a new set of ideas.98 Bernie Sanders, on the 
other hand, has been a prominent entrepreneur on behalf of a counter-hegemonic set of ideas. 
According to Senator Sanders, those hurt by international trade and the financial crisis have a common 
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enemy: the billionaire class. Despite powerful institutional efforts at obstruction, Sanders has 
mobilized a multiracial, geographically diffuse base of support. By framing American hegemony, 
international trade, and economic growth as an existential class conflict, Sanders has given voice to a 
viable socialist alternative and remains the only indication of a political realignment. The neo-
Gramscian strategy for attaining hegemony is through a democratic “war of position.”99 The war of 
position is a long-term strategy aimed at capturing control of political institutions. Even if Sanders 
does not win the Presidency, he has successfully shifted the conversation to the left, causing centrist 
politicians to affirm his policies, and has distributed leadership opportunities to a new generation of 
socialists.  
Robinson argues that fascist movements are triggered by capitalist crises. Economic conditions 
are variables of constant change and can never be the monocausal origins of political events. Structural 
explanations for the emergence of fascism are unable to incorporate historical anomalies that do fit 
their grand theories. For example, the original fascist movements in Italy predated Black Tuesday by 
nearly a decade. So too, proto-fascists movements and far-right parties have been a constant in the 
second half of the 20th century. While the 2008 bank bailout further redistributed capital into the hands 
of the already-wealthy, high-levels of inequality existed then as they do now. Notions such as crisis or 
change are nothing more than folkloric mythologies, a fetish beloved by historians and social 
scientists. Crisis theories, including Marxist crisis theories, rely upon historical assumptions of 
exceptional times distinct from the norm. Capitalism-in-perpetual-crisis has been the mainstay of the 
past five-hundred years. Crisis and fascism are always-already here, present even in their absence, a 
spiritual force deceptively making its own material reality. Historical materialism, power transition 
theory, and political realignment are predicated upon inferences, drawn from analogies and cyclical 
patterns, that, in the end, are based upon fallacious logics.  
Comparative-historical theories draw lessons from the politics of 1968 and 1980, or the politics 
of 1929 and 1939, and apply them to contemporary politics. As Karl Marx observed in “The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” this mode of generalization makes a caricature of historical 
repetition.100 If history happens twice, should we be thankful that the tragedy of Hitler is revived 
through a farcical Trump? Marx criticized the Revolution of 1848 for parodying the Revolution of 
1789. The past exists only as a dogma and the application of lessons from yesteryear is equivalent to a 
belief in miracles. Comparisons of Trump to Hitler or Mussolini are no less accurate than those 
comparing him to Napoleon III.101 Trump and Sanders are singular world historic figures and not 
crisis actors whose arrival were necessitated by structural conditions.  
For Robinson, capitalist crises are synonymous with legitimation crises. The role of ideas and 
political institutions are worth analyzing independently. In the early 20th century, the Russian October 
Revolution spawned moral panics throughout Europe about the dangers of radical ideas and popular 
movements. In Germany, the exclusion of communist parties and the fragility of the Weimar Republic 
contributed to the rise of National Socialism. Colin Crouch argues that the “strange non-death of 
neoliberalism” after the 2008 financial crisis is due to the hollow nature of contemporary democratic 
institutions.102 The extravagance of elections, obsession with personalities, advertising, focus groups, 
opinion polls, and outsized influence of wealthy donors are evidence of democracy-without-ideas. 
There are parallels with the global capitalism school and theories of post-democracy. Robinson’s 
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magnum opus Promoting Polyarchy argued that the promotion of democracy throughout the Global 
South was a subversive effort to pacify popular movements, create corruptible institutions, and 
promote the interests of American foreign policy and transnational capitalists.103  The dictatorship of 
the transnational capitalist class has come at the expense of weak political elites and national political 
institutions. The development of a transnational state apparatus was designed to detach policy making 
from democratic accountability. The global rise of authoritarian populists is equally due to the failures 
of democratic institutions.   
An unholy trinity pitting nation-states and transnational capitalists against civil-society has 
created a brave new world with “democracy at bay.” The result has been the total defeat of leftist 
alternatives.104 Trump has not prohibited political opposition to the same degree as the Enabling Act. 
However, the failures of the Pink Tide and Syriza reveal the institutional obstacles to leftist popular 
movements. The neo-Gramscian “war of position” is a tacit acceptance of the futility in triumphing 
over totalizing global capitalism. Sanders and the socialist counterforce face insurmountable 
impediments, both in winning the upcoming election, building a socialist base, and advancing policies 
once in office. The structural power of capital and the frailty of contemporary political institutions 
make an insurgent socialist movement a Sisyphean task.  
Between an unrealizable socialism and a present-day fascism there is an excluded middle. 
Liberals, too, have a theory of change: muddling through.105 To muddle through is to solve crises and 
policy problems by means of incremental progress. Status quo crises are, here, valuable not 
deleterious, and ought to be countered with system-preserving behavior. Liberal theories of change 
conceal theories of endurance. Liberalism is untroubled by the need to offer new ideas or deliver 
transformative reforms. Muddling through promises that thing will stay the same by gradually getting 
worse. The allegation of post-democratic thinkers is that liberalism has assumed an authoritarian 
countenance. Political theorist Sheldon Wolin utilizes the label “inverted totalitarianism” to describe 
the façade of contemporary democracy: “Inverted totalitarianism perpetuates politics all the time… but 
a politics that is not political.”106 Liberal politicians are architects of authoritarian governance. The 
reemergence of fascism has followed the establishment of neoliberal authoritarianism.107 The specter 
of a revived fascism reveals the hypocrisy underpinning liberal politics.  
As secular stagnation persists indefinitely, 21st century fascism becomes the new normal. 
Trumpism, the conservative political establishment, and far-right social forces will outlive the regime. 
If the election of Trump proves to be a lasting political realignment it mirrors the contentlessness of 
Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign of hope and change. William Robinson and Mario Barrera, years 
prior to Trump’s political ascent, provocatively caricatured the Obama regime “as a Weimar 
republic.”108 The Obama administration is a case study in the politics of appeasement. However, it is 
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not enough to blame Obama for being an ineffective stop-gap, his policies, on deportation, family 
separation, extrajudicial execution, etc., are illustrative of fascism-with-a-friendly-face.109 
From Article 48 to Telegraph 71 
Fascism became an all-purpose term because  
one can eliminate from a fascist regime one or more features,  
and it will still be recognizable as fascist. 
-Umberto Eco 
Donald Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” is an exemplar signifier of 
“palingenetic ultranationalism.” If nationalism is the ideological foundation of fascism, palingenesis is 
the performative dimension that exemplifies its aesthetic. The new consensus reprises the follies 
which have troubled the study of fascism. The early Italian fascist movements pre-dated the Wall 
Street Crash of 1929 and were not antisemitic. The “Manifesto of the Italian Fasci” was heavily 
influenced by the artistic movement futurism and not based upon appeals for reclaiming mythic 
history. Today, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is routinely marked a fascist demagogue, but is 
pursuing policies to further open the country to transnational business. Instead of a minimal 
essentialism, fascist movements are complex and heterogenous.110 There is an entire ecology of 
fascism. Common traits include, but are not limited to: propaganda and the telling of “big lies,” 
symbolic and rhetorical strategies aimed at inducing affective contagion amongst mass audiences, 
traditionalism and a rejection of the latest social norms, racial anxieties and the use of scapegoating, 
appeals to masculine, corporeal, and sexual fantasies, charismatic leaders, fetishization of violence, 
unquestioned deference to law-and-order, they identify as right-wing and anti-Marxist, and have 
transnational relationships.111 Fascist movements replicate standard rituals, such as coded and private 
language, slogans, uniforms, symbols, hand-signals, and slurs. Fascism flourishes in masses and is 
characterized by rallies. Fascist extremists valorize violence as the solution to social problems. Where 
there is fascism there are street-battles, paramilitary organizations, lone-wolf terrorists, secret police, 
and concentration camps.  
The ecosystem of fascist actors includes movements, institutions, and leaders. A symbiotic 
relationship exists between political leaders and followers. Wilhelm Reich blamed the rise of fascism 
on a generalizable suppression of sexual desire and rigid families. Theodor Adorno and his colleagues 
created an all-encompassing scale to measure adherence to hierarchy, aggressive tendencies, and 
superstitious beliefs.112 Post-structuralists warn of an innate desire for power, what Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari call micro-fascism.113 The strong Führer-figure (super-ego) enchants obedient adherents 
(ego) by stimulating their unconscious desires (id). The confluence of class, racial, and sexual 
antagonism are social and psychological. For Reich, it is important to recognize that supporters are not 
deceived by propaganda. Grievances are channeled into certain types of prejudice. Economic position 
is supplanted by the social benefits of group belonging. Leaders induce followers through libidinal 
investments in status conferred on their positions in the social hierarchy. Racism and sexism, 
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therefore, are not particular attitudes but material interests.114 Fascism is less a matter of ideology than 
a politicization of social psychology.  
The ecology of fascism is useful for understanding the 2016 election. For William Robinson, 
21st century fascism was emergent prior to Trump, indicating the Tea Party and the Republican party 
establishment as propelling forces. However, Trump gave voice to rhetoric and policies that were not 
expressed by rival politicians. From the perspective of liberals, it seemed that a fascist movement 
materialized instantaneously, ready-made. The Republican party was initially hostile to Trump and 
some have sought to contain his administration. Trump has delivered tax cuts and filled the judiciary, 
objectives long sought by Republican elites. Trump primarily promotes himself and has not formed a 
network of ideational entrepreneurs. The dynamics constituting the current fascist ecosystem are not 
unified.115 The ready exposure of these contradictions disclose the weakness of the regime in power. 
Fascism has no monocausal origin. Causes of fascism include global power transitions, 
capitalist crises, fragile democratic institutions, social disruption, and charismatic demagogues. Some 
have tried to affix a longer time horizon upon the 20th century fascist convergence. The economic 
historian Karl Polanyi once claimed: “In order to comprehend German fascism, we must revert to 
Ricardian England.”116 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment located 
the “triumphant calamity” of fascism within the enlightenment.117 The Caribbean poet Aimé Césaire 
proclaimed the shock of the Holocaust was that violence reserved for people of color was employed 
upon whites. “[They] applied Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved 
exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa.”118 European 
colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” where the techniques of violence and domination 
mastered in the periphery were applied to the metropole. Fascism does not emerge ex nihilo. The 
events heralding the emergence of a fascist movement appeared suddenly but were the culmination of 
a long fetch of history. The long disaster of a slow-moving, imperceptible fascism reveals its dormant 
structure.  
The American historian Robert Paxton described a life-cycle of fascism that consists of five 
stages: 1) creation of the movement, 2) rooting the movement in parties, 3) acquiring power, 4) 
exercising power, 5) further radicalization or entropy.119 The current ecology of fascism complicates 
the application of Paxton’s stages to present-day circumstances. Neither the Tea Party movement nor 
Trump are the primary driver of the fascist resurgence. Neither have successfully rooted themselves in 
the Republican party. Trump has acquired power but has been frustrated in exercising it.  
One thing is certain: Trump has inherited a totalitarian global police state. For the past century, 
the U.S. has waged a perpetual World War. The War on Terror, launched by the last Republican 
President, was marked by the conferral of unchecked, exceptional powers to military and intelligence 
services. The September 11th terrorist attacks were the impetus for executive orders authorizing the 
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indefinite detention of enemy combatants. Protected neither by national nor international law, 
detainees remain imprisoned, never to stand trial. Simon Critchley characterized the logic of the Bush 
regime’s global war as “crypto-Schmittian,”120 Carl Schmitt being the Nazi legal scholar who justified 
the “state of exception.”121 The state of exception was given legal form through Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution, which was invoked by Adolf Hitler in the aftermath of the 1933 Reichstag fire. 
Article 48 symbolizes the transition from an emergent fascist movement to a fully-formed fascism.  
The state of exception epitomizes the extralegal machinations necessary for organized mass 
death. Fascism is not threatening without a police apparatus and not extraordinarily horrific if 
dissimilar polities commit similar atrocities. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues that the 
state of exception is the very paradigm of government.122 Little Eichmanns, ordinary bureaucrats 
willing to kill and torture out of duty, are ubiquitous figures in fascist and liberal states.123 The Nazi 
regime used the genocide of Native Americans and Jim Crow police laws as their model.124 During 
World War II, the American government detained Japanese Americans in concentration camps 
without trial. In the past century, the U.S. has waged multiple wars, assassinated numerous foreign 
leaders, frequently initiated civil wars, and assisted in several genocides.125 Deleuze and Guattari’s 
fascination with fascism culminates in their comparison of American world order and the so-called 
democratic peace with fascism. “[I]t is peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process 
of total war… [T]here was no longer a need for fascism. The Fascists were only child precursors, and 
the absolute peace… succeeded where total war had failed. The Third World War was already upon 
us.”126 When there are people disappeared inside military prisons without due process, communities 
imprisoned by the tens of millions, thousands of unarmed civilians extrajudicially executed by police 
annually, asylum seekers refused, children separated from their parents, and tens of millions of foreign 
citizens mass murdered, there is no justice and there is no peace. If our labels and theories call this 
peace but dare not call it fascism, what good are these theories? The emergence of 21st century fascism 
in the United States has as its origins hundreds of years of settler-colonial, racial, and imperial 
violence.  
The life-cycle of fascism by Deleuze and Guattari entails a cancerous body politic become 
suicidal.127 Micro-fascism spreads throughout the whole social body and fascist movements capture 
the state apparatus from below. Instead of a state appropriating military and police institutions, a 
war/law-and-order mentality appropriates the state. The horrific characteristic of fascism is not its 
causes, or its internal distribution of power, but the processes of organized violence that ensue. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, fascism is ideological only insofar as it is based upon a cult of death. Its self-
creation is subsumed by the necessity of its self-destruction. The Falangist slogan “Viva la muerte!” is 
realized in Telegram 71. Facing imminent defeat Hitler ordered the destruction of all public 
 
120 Simon Critchley. “Crypto-Schmittianism – The Logic of the Political in Bush’s America.” Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of 
Resistance. Verso: London, UK. 2007.  
121 Carl Schmitt. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Tr. George Schwab. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL. 2005. 
Carl Schmitt. Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-Struggle. Tr. Michael Hoelzl and Graham 
Ward. Polity: Cambridge, UK. 2014.  
122 Giorgio Agamben. State of Exception. Tr. Kevin Attell. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL. 2005. 
123 Hannah Arendt. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking Press: New York, NY. 1963.  
124 James Q. Whitman. Hitler's American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 2017.  
125 Some still have the audacity to declare the emergence of a “perpetual world peace,” and journals with the temerity to publish such nonsense. Michael 
Mousseau. “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace.” International Security. Vol. 44. 
No. 1. 2019. 
126 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Tr. Brian Massumi. University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis, MN. 1988. pg. 467.  
127 John Protevi. “’A Problem of Pure Matter’: Deleuze and Guattari's Treatment of Fascist Nihilism in A Thousand Plateaus.” Nihilism Now!: ‘Monsters 
of Energy’ (eds. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Diane Morgan). Macmillan: London, UK. 2000. 
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infrastructure and vital reserves: “If the war is lost, the nation will also perish. This fate is inevitable.” 
The state of exception where the law no longer applies is analogous to collective death where nobody 
is spared. The struggle against 21st century fascism, therefore, is also a struggle against the realized 
nihilism of a suicidal liberalism. Capitalist civilization has charted a one-way, irreversible course 
towards planetary destruction and the extinction of the species. Ecological and systemic collapse 
portend a fascism-to-come infinitely more terrifying than the Trump regime.128     
Two Anonymous Texts: “Thinking from the Wreckage” 
But the fascist game can be played in many forms,  
and the name of the game does not change. 
-Umberto Eco 
 In finale, two anonymous texts, written immediately before and after the 2016 election, serve 
as a gigantomachy displaying the present-day struggle between fascist and anti-fascist forces. 
Publius Decius Mus’ essay “The Flight 93 Election” is one of the historic documents of the 
2016 election. Published anonymously in the Claremont Review of Books, the essay was the climatic 
call-to-arms of a group of conservative political theorists who sought to defend a “coherent, sensible 
Trumpism.”129 Throughout the primary, an online journal by the name of The Journal of American 
Greatness operated as a clearinghouse for those challenging the dogma and entrenched power of 
conservative elites. The “Mission Statement” of the journal attacks the World Economic Forum and 
Club for Growth, the Wall Street Journal and National Interest, Max Boot and Robert Kagan, as signs 
of a conservative ideology betrayed.130 Exposing conformity, they envisioned the Donald Trump 
campaign as an anti-intellectual, anti-globalist, anti-idealist alternative. The Journal of American 
Greatness sought to make serious and credible Anders Breivik’s manifesto for those most at home 
reading Leo Strauss.131 The character Publius Decius Mus plays the role of vanguard and the essay 
“The Flight 93 Election” serves as the new manifesto for 21st century fascism.  
Published two months prior to the general election, “The Flight 93 Election” is predicated upon 
a simple premise: “charge the cockpit or you die.”132 The essay brandishes the terror of an aging 
generation, one aggrieved by unrealized expectations, invested in possessive inheritance, fearful of 
outside threats and hegemonic decline, and convinced of internal paralysis. However, the apocalyptic 
urgency is all for not. Neither natural disasters, economic shocks, international conflict, nor 
democratic backsliding are portended. The gravest threat iterated is multiculturalism. Repeated 
references to changing demographics demonstrates the author’s self-identification with white culture 
and pronounced xenophobia. Loss of an imagined community is an imagined catastrophe. The logic 
of the piece is self-assurance in search of exigence. As the author ironically posits, wishing for a 
tautology to enact itself is not an argument. The true (irrational) terror of the Flight 93 election for 
dear Publius was “a million more Syrians,” which was not a policy of the Hillary Clinton campaign, a 
realistic scenario, nor would it threaten markets or lives.   
 
128 Andrew Johnson. “Twilight of the Humans: Nietzsche, Dismal Politics, and the Coming Planetary Apocalypse.” The Agonist: A Nietzsche Circle 
Journal. Vol. 7. No. 2. 2019.  
129 Publius Decius Mus. “Toward a Sensible, Coherent Trumpism.” The Unz Review: An Alternative Media Selection. March, 2016. 
130 “Our Mission Statement.” The Journal of American Greatness.  
131 Publius Decius Mus is the pseudonym of Michael Anton, who served as Deputy Assistant for Strategic Communication on the United States National 
Security Council for most of Trump’s first term.  
132 Publius Decius Mus. “The Flight 93 Election.” Claremont Review of Books. September 2016.  
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There is a crisis identified though, a crisis of conservatism. The stylistic flair is a conjuring 
trick intended to hide the singular purpose of motivating voters and feigning seriousness. Publius 
Decius Mus acknowledges but is unbothered that Trump is a “loudmouth” and “worse than imperfect.” 
What is defended, fanatically, is Trumpism, defined by three central policy planks: secure borders, 
economic nationalism, and an America-first foreign policy. The author is a paleoconservative, 
antagonistic to neo-conservativism, harkening back to Pat Buchanan. Trumpism represents a mythic 
repetition of a weary Reaganism. There is an appeal for neoliberalism without globalization, 
conservatism without apology, unencumbered by checks and balances. Even the B-movie actor 
farcically reappears. The 2016 election is imagined as a crisis of conservative ideology. A defeat 
would be a repudiation of conservativism. Publius mistakes the value of a political philosophy for the 
results of an election. Understated is a deeper fear of declining conservative hegemony. Unrealized is 
that Trump threatens the survival of the Republican party far more than unfavorable results in a single 
election cycle. If there is something exceptional about Trump it is the intensification of crisis. The 
politics of Trump is that if he loses, may the nation also perish. Publius Decius Mus fastens 
conservativism to a realized nihilism, promising to destroy what it sought to safeguard.   
What makes “The Flight 93 Election” a historic document is that a) Trump proved victorious 
and b) this is one of the few (certainly the chicest) intellectual attempts to advocate on behalf of this 
victory. What makes this document exceptional is the irrationality behind the terror it presupposes. 
Immigration and trade policies, ideologies and cultural identity, will remain contested issues within 
American politics. The invocation of existential stakes, “win this election or die,” transforms an 
election into a war. Mr. Decius Mus is aware of the fascism implicit within his argument. “The Left 
was calling us Nazis long before any pro-Trumpers tweeted Holocaust denial memes.” The hyperbolic 
propensity of the “fascism charge” excuses not just Holocaust denial, but white supremacist rallies, 
targeted terrorism, and family separation. In conjunction with the crisis of conservatism is an 
exaggerated danger of the radical left. For Publius, the left is an enemy and justifies militancy. 
Partisan politics becomes a contest for asserting victory and domination, fascist spiritedness, at any 
cost. The Flight 93 election, therefore, never ends, the crash perpetually delayed, reimagined every 
election campaign.  
Liberals and the radical left shared an experience of 2016 as a Flight 93 election. The 
campaign of a fascist demagogue was widely portrayed by liberal elites as an existential threat to 
democratic institutions and America’s global standing. However, no one charged the cockpit. The 
Trump Presidency is the collective experience of the resulting crash.  
One month after the President Trump’s inauguration, an essay appeared on a blog entitled 
Research & Destroy.133 “The Landing: Fascists without Fascism” is haunted by “The Flight 93 
Election.” The essay begins by asking the reader to imagine a plane crashing. “So the presidential 
election of 2016 seemed to those on the plane.”134 Unlike “The Flight 93 Election,” “The Landing: 
Fascists without Fascism” did not receive much fanfare, but is equally deserving of appraisal as an 
(subterranean) historic document. “The Landing” has a double meaning. Written after the election, the 
anonymous author asks the reader to look-backwards at the crash-landing, to the experience of the 
crash, of seeing it coming, and what led to it. Research & Destroy depicts the catastrophe of Trump as 
an abrupt immediacy. Trump is described as an event, the crossing of a threshold, a break, a present 
without history. What appears fascist is the experience of an exceptional election that repudiates past 
 
133 Even if I knew the author behind Research & Destroy, I would not reveal that person’s name. 
134 “The Landing: Fascists without Fascism.” Research & Destroy. February 2017.  
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norms. However, this is precisely what that author aims to deconstruct. While the election of Trump 
arrives as a new history, it is a repetition of history and the culmination of a progressive disaster. The 
catastrophe is not Trump’s sudden appearance, but the aftermath of a protracted, drawn-out failure. 
For Research & Destroy, this represents the historical contradiction of the 2016 election. The shock of 
Trump’s victory as an immediate crisis, a crisis-in-itself, belies the complex conjunctural conditions 
that precipitated the long crisis of hegemony of which he is the consequence. What unites “The 
Landing: Fascists without Fascism” with William Robinson’s theory of 21st century fascism is a 
staging of Trumpism as both wholly original and not-original.  
The additional meaning of “The Landing” indicates that the catastrophe is on-going. The 
crash-landing denotes a beachhead from which fascism begins its incursion. For Research & Destroy, 
the Trump regime exhibits a simulacrum of fascism, colorfully termed “fascists without fascism.” The 
rhetoric, the shock and awe, ape the appearance of power without the corresponding mastery of state 
institutions or the support of elites. Trump’s neo-fascism has not overcome institutional obstructions, 
nor has it eliminated countervailing democratic forces. The counterpoised phrase “fascism without 
fascists” is an equally potent descriptor of American politics. The history of the United States consists 
of a legacy of superfluous settler-colonial, racial, and imperial violence, undeterred in its abuse of 
power. Ultranationalism and palingenesis has not been the lone prerequisite for exploitation, 
incarceration, or genocide. The opening of markets and spreading of democracy has justified mass 
death. If there was a dormant fascism awaiting a moment of crisis, there was likewise a friendly 
fascism that authorized mass death in idealistic terms and without rhetorical malice. The fascist 
landing is a continuation of the wreckage brought about by liberalism. Fascism-without-fascists is a 
theory of structural fascism. Structural fascism reveals that liberalism is coextensive with fascist 
politics. Dialectically, structural fascism functions as a mediation of historic fascism and Neo-
Fascism, revising and extending the originary intention of Umberto Eco’s “Ur-Fascism.”  
For the anonymous author of “The Landing: Fascists without Fascism,” the spontaneous 
blockade of airports is the event which catalyzes the struggle against 21st century fascism. Airports are 
“already in fascism,” the state of exception where police power is preestablished as unlimited. 
Airports acted as the boundary of what was contestable under liberal politics and are, thus, linked to a 
continual struggle marked by other sites, such as Zuccotti 
Park, Ferguson, and Standing Rock. As a postscript to the 
procession of horrors of the Trump Administration, the 
response by the Jewish resistance movement to the policy of 
family separation and concentration camps is that “Never 
Again is Now.” As explained by the Jewish cartoonist Eli 
Valley: “The cautionary tale of European Jews deluded about 
their safety at the dawn of the 20th century has by now b
ecome cliché. But it is happening here—not systemically to 
Jews, not immediately, but it’s already begun against other 
communities, and it’s getting worse.”135 Under the shadow of 
a former fascism, the present metalepsis is abused by the far-
right to denounce their adversaries and omit their 
transgressions. It is insignificant whether Trump and his 
supporters are “minimally fascist” but of great import is the 
maximum limit of crimes and atrocities they are permitted to 
 
135 Eli Valley. “A Springtime of Erasure.” Jewish Currents. November 2019. 
Figure 1: From “On Nazi Imagery Today” by Eli 
Valley, 2017 
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commit. Research & Destroy asks the reader to think from the wreckage. “[T]here is no way back… 
The plane has crash-landed in the shuddering present. It will not magically reassemble itself like film 
running backward.” The apocalypticism of the essay emits a warning of structural fascism become 
eternal fascism. Trump is a harbinger of a fascism-to-come. A dismal, melancholy future awaits, of an 
existential political conflict, portending ecological and systemic collapse, a fascism-without-end. 
The formulaic conclusions of the neo-Gramscians are derived from Antonio Gramsci’s adage 
to adopt a “pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will.”136 By admonish their readers that the 
future is unwritten and contingent, that everyday actors retain a high degree of agency, the Neo-
Gramscian school clings to a forlorn belief in the triumphant structure of history. A pessimistic 
imagination of a hyperbolic fascism without scale, limit, or historical precedent, is contrasted with the 
optimistic belief in its eventual defeat. The strength of a pessimistic theory of history is its rejection of 
existing models of change. A dismal, melancholy science teaches that the history of civilization is a 
series of intensifying atrocities. Walter Benjamin, in Thesis VIII of “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History,” observes that the “tradition of the oppressed” teaches us that fascism is not a historical 
exception but the historic norm.137 The current amazement that fascism is “still” possible in the 21st 
century stems from our historical myopia, the organized forgetting and ignoring of mass death. 
Attaining to a conception of history in keeping with this insight suggests that the fascist exception is a 
continuance of liberal norms. The revival of a fascist imaginary reminds that there are no limits to 
atrocity. The “real” state of emergency is here and now, it has always been here and now, and it is our 
lot to survive amidst the wreckage. 
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